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Reed: Searches by Administrative Agencies after Barlow's and Tyler: Fou

SEARCHES BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AFTER BARLOW'S AND TYLER: FOURTH
AMENDMENT PITFALLS AND SHORT-CUTS
In 1967 the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal
Court' overruled Frank v. Maryland2 and held that searches
by administrative agencies must ordinarily be conducted
pursuant to a search warrant. The companion case of See v.
Seattle' extended this new Fourth Amendment protection to
commercial as well as residential property. To reconcile this
new search warrant requirement with the Fourth Amendment command that "no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause," the Camara Court adopted an expansive
definition of probable cause in the context of administrative
searches 4 (referred to as administrative probable cause in
this comment).
In 1970 and 1972 the Supreme Court created an exception by holding that two highly regulated businesses, liquor
(Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States'), and firearms
(United States v. Biswell6 ) could be forced to submit to warrantless, nonconsensual searches by federal agents or face a
penalty for refusing to allow the search. These exceptions increased interest in the question reserved in See7 of what
other searches by administrative agencies could be conducted without warrants.
Recently in Marshall v. Barlow 's8 the Supreme Court

held that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) may not conduct nonconsensual searches without a warrant or the equivalent and discussed Camara,See,
Colonnade and Biswell. Eight days later in Michigan v.
Tyler' the Court held inadmissible evidence of arson obtained from a gutted building without a warrant and not obtained during the initial firefighting visit. The Tyler Court
went beyond the facts of the case to discuss under what circumstances officials investigating the cause of a fire may
conduct warrantless searches or searches supported by a
Copyright© 1979 by the University of Wyoming
1. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
2. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, reh. den. 360 U.S. 914 (1959).
3. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
4. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 534-538.
5. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
6. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
7. See v. Seattle, supra note 3, at 546.
8. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
9. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 11978).
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warrant issued on the basis of administrative probable
cause. This comment discusses searches by administrative
agencies in light of Barlow's and Tyler, their four progenitor
cases and some of the lower court case law.
WHEN WILL WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

BE

PERMITTED?

Businesses Subject to a Colonnade-BiswellException

The Barlow's Court suggested several reasons for
distinguishing OSHA inspection from those of liquor and
firearms businesses. First, there is a long tradition of close
government supervision of firearms and liquor. The significance of the tradition is that one enters a regulated business
wioh a reduced expectation of privacy.10 The Barlow's Court
also emphasized that Colonnade and Biswell "represent
unique responses to relatively unique circumstances.""
Secondly, the Barlow's Court also stated that, "the reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend
upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees
of each statute." 2 This concern for enforcement needs is also
evident in Camara where the Court said, "whether the
authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant ...
depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purposes behind
the search."' 3 Similarly, in dictum in his concurrence in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States Mr. Justice Powell indi-

cated a willingness to stretch the definition of adminis4
trative probable cause on the basis of government need.'
In upholding the warrantless search of a pawn shop
federally licensed to sell guns, the Biswell Court said, "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent,
unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In
this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily
frustrate inspection; and if necessary flexibility as to time,
scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible."'" In Barlow's,
10.

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 313.

11.

Id.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 321.
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1,at 533.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 281-282 (1973).
United States v.Biswell, supra note 6, at 316.
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however, the Court made it clear that the need for surprise
inspections alone will not justify a Colonnade-Biswell exception since ex parte warrants allow for such surprise inspections. 6
Most administrative agency inspectors are not armed
and will need to enlist the aid of a U.S. Marshall if refused entry. In those cases in which an administrative inspection is a
genuine raid, the agency will have had to have done advance
planning with the U.S. Marshall's Office. In such a case, it is
difficult to see how the necessity to obtain a warrant would
destroy the effectiveness of the raid.
The Barlow's Court also noted that if a statute authorizing warrantless searches applies only to a single industry,
regulation might already be so pervasive that a ColonnadeBiswell exception could apply. 7
Finally, the Barlow's Court distinguished the Colonnade
and Biswell cases on the basis that the liquor and firearms
businesses involve a grant of a federal license.' 8
At least one circuit and three district courts have held
that businesses regulated by the Food and Drug Administration are subject to a Biswell-Colonnade exception even
though they are not federally licensed. 9 These courts rationalized that regulation of the food and drug industry is as
important and pervasive as regulation of the liquor and
firearms businesses. A district court 20 has held that warrantless, nonconsensual searches of coal mines may be conducted pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act.2 '
These lower court decisions shed light on whether an industry will be subject to a Biswell-Colonnade exception in
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 319, 320.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 313.
United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682. 685 (2nd Cir. 1974);
United States v. Litvin, 353 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.C. 1973); United States v. Del
Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (D.Del. 1972); United States v.
Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141, 143 (N.D. 1973). It should also be mentioned that in United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952) the Court upheld warrantless searches under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Since the Cardiff
case predates Camara its authority is weak. Cardiff was cited with neither approval
nor disapproval in See, supra note 3, at 544 N. 4.
Youghiogeny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
30 U.S.C. § 813(a) et seq.
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two ways. In United States v. Business Builders, Inc., the
district court, in upholding warrantless inspections of
warehouses containing food subject to federal regulation, offers an appealing rationale: "It would be an affront to common sense to say that the public interest is not as deeply involved in the regulation of the food industry as it is in the liquor and firearms industries."" Many agencies might offer a
similar rationale. However, OSHA lost the Barlow's case
despite the availability of such a rationale. In Terraciano v.
Montanye the privacy guarantees of the state police inspection scheme were poor but the Second Circuit overruled and
chastised the district court for "overreading" the portion of
the Biswell opinion requiring warrantless, nonconsensual
searches to be "carefully limited in time, place and scope. "23
It can be assumed that occasionally lower federal courts and
state courts will uphold warrantless, nonconsensual searches
which do not meet Supreme Court guidelines.
Even if a court decides that an administrative agency is
entitled to conduct searches without a warrant or to seek
penalties against a person who refuses to allow a warrantless
search, it may deny the agency the ability to make the election. In Colonnade the Supreme Court held that defendants'
motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a forcible, warrantless search should have been granted. The Colonnade Court indicated that Congress had the constitutional
power to authorize forcible warrantless searches of liquor
retailers but had instead chosen to make refusal to allow a
warrantless search a crime. "Under the existing statutes,
Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible
entries without a warrant," the Court said.2 '
Open Fields Exception
In at least one situation warrantless administrative
searches should be permissible. In Hester v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that, "the special protection accord22.
23.
24.

United States v. Business Builders. Inc., 354 F Supp. 141, 143Terraciano v. Montanye, supra note 19. at 684, citing United States v. BisweU,
supra note 6 at 315.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra note 5. at 77: United States v.
Biswell. supra note 6, is less clear on this point. The Biswell defendant initially protested the search but "consented" when read a copy of a federal statute making his
refusal to consent a criminal offense. Id- at 90-91. The citation of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. supra note 5,by the Biswell Court could be interpreted
as indicating that the search could not have produced admissible evidence unless
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ed by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers and effects' is not extended to the open
fields" 5 This exception was affirmed recently in Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.2" In that case,
the court refused to suppress evidence obtained by a Colorado official who observed smoke plumes after entering the
open fields of Western Alfalfa Corp. without consent and
without notice.
Traditionally, the courts have defined open fields as all
the grounds except the curtilege. 7 The Western Alfalfa
Court did not define open fields but stated that, "we are not
advised that [the inspector] was on the premises from which
the public was excluded." 2 The mere posting of "No
Trespassing" signs will not vitiate "open field" status. 9
Emergencies
Emergency situations might also lend themselves to
warrantless searches by administrative agencies. In Camara
the Court said, "[Niothing we say today is intended to
foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that
the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations."3
Similarly, the Tyler court held that no warrant is required
for entry to fight a fire "and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate
the cause of the blaze.

' 31

As noted above, the Court in

several cases has indicated that reasonable warrantless
searches by administrative agencies would be allowed when
necessary. 2 If an administrative agency publishes
guidelines defining emergencies in which resort to a warrant
will make a reasonable enforcement objective impossible,
and if the search guidelines insure minimal intrusions on
privacy, then it is likely that such warrantless searches will
be upheld. The emergency exceptions cited in Camara were

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

the defendant gave this forced consent. United States v. Biswell, supra note 6 at 91.
But other language in the Biswell opinion suggests that the defendant's "consent"
was irrelevant in determining the admissibility of the fruits of the search. ld. at
91-92.
Hester v. United States, 266 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
E.g., McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1967).
Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., supra note 26, at 865.
McDowell v. United States, supra note 27, at 602.
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 539.
Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9 at 511.
See, Notes 12, 13 and 15, supra
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seizure of unwholesome food,33 compulsory smallpox vaccination,34 health quarantine,3" and summary destruction of
36
tubercular cattle.
Can a Permit be Conditioned Upon Consent to Search?
Many administrative agencies issue permits. The question immediately arises: can the agency do indirectly what it
cannot do directly; namely can the agency condition the continued possession of a permit upon the permittee's consent
to allow the agency to search the premises?
The doctrine that a state may condition a privilege upon
waiver of constitutional rights is officially dead. 7 However,
there is one modern case which raises a suspicion that the
doctrine that receipt of a benefit may be conditioned upon
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is alive but in disguise.
In Wyman v. James the Supreme Court held that the State
of New York may condition continued eligibility for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children upon the recipient's consent to be interviewed in her home by a caseworker. 8 The
James Court denied that the home visit was a search, but
declared that the holding would be the same even if the visit
were a search.3
The James Court did not view the case as involving
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, 40 but the dissent interpreted James as a waiver case.4 The Court's opinion pointed
out that the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable
searches," and cited Camara for the proposition that, "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a [warrantless] search . .. is unreasonable." 2 But the Court concluded that the facts presented just such a special case and
that, therefore, the home visit by the caseworker was not an
unreasonable search. Thus, Wyman v. James is nominally
not a waiver case, even though the Court found that the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410,
416 (1971).
Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
Id. at 317-318.
Id. at 324.
Id at 328.
Id. at 316 citing Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 528-9.
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search was reasonable, in part, precisely because the welfare
recipient could refuse to allow the search and stop receiving
welfare.

43

In justifying the Wyman v. James decision, the Court
listed eleven reasons which appear to encompass the four
criteria distinguishing Biswell and Colonnade from Camara,
See and Barlow's." First, the Court stressed that the warrantless scheme of home visits was necessary to the enforcement scheme, and that the privacy invasion was minimal
because the caseworker gave advance notice of the visit by
mail.45 Second, like a licensing scheme, the welfare
recipient's involvement is voluntary-one enters with
knowledge of the search requirements. The Court stated that
the recipient was perfectly free to refuse the search and give
up the aid.46 Third, although the Court did not speak of a
long tradition of government regulation of welfare recipients, it discussed the public trust aspect of dispensing
public charity and the lesser expectation of privacy of a recipient of charity.4" Fourth, the Court did not emphasize this
point, but the statutory search authority in Wyman v.
James is confined to those seeking public assistance." This
authority might be considered less broad than some
regulatory schemes covering a large number of industries. If
Wyman v. James is not a waiver case, it is probably no more
helpful to administrative agencies than Biswell or Colonnade.
In California v. LaRue" the Court held that California
could condition a liquor license on the absence of certain sexual entertainment, First Amendment claims notwithstanding. However, that case has limited application to most administrative agencies since the majority opinion stated that
the authority to impose conditions for a liquor license
derives from the Twenty-First Amendment.5" Other cases involving a challenge to a claimed conditioning of a benefit
upon waiver of constitutional rights are more convincingly
explained by the Court as not involving waiver.5 '
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Wyman v. Jones, supra note 37, at 324.
Id. at 318-324.
Id. at 320-321.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 311 N.2.
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Id at 114-115.
E.g., Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission, 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
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The Colonnade distinction between a warrantless,
forceable search and a sanction for refusing to allow a warrantless search may be relevant here.52 The limitation to the
latter in Colonnade was based on a statute so it was not
necessary for the Court to reach the constitutional necessity
of the limitation. In fact, in Biswell the Court indicated in
dictum that the police could have used force to search the
guns in the pawnshop if the owner had withheld "consent"
after being advised that refusal to "consent" was a criminal
violation.53 It is possible, however, that a sanction for refusing to allow a search, especially one not involving criminal
penalties (such as a permit revocation or welfare cut-off) will
be considered "reasonable" whereas a forceable warrantless
search would not. Even the Barlow's Court had this to say
about the Colonnade-Biswell exception, "Businessmen... in

such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the
burdens as well as the benefits of their trade. The
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the
restrictions placed upon him. 5 It is thus difficult to predict
whether attempts by administrative agencies to condition
permits upon consent to search will survive constitutional
challenge.
There is, however, one narrow situation in which a court
would be more likely to find conditioning a license upon consent to search constitutional. In See the Court said, "Nor do
we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a
business or marketing a product. A constitutional challenge
to such programs can only be resolved... on a case by case
basis."5 5 The Ninth Circuit in a recent case commented that
the See Court declined to extend Fourth Amendment requirements to such inspections. 6
ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTES BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

IF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE NOT ALLOWED

When Should an Administrative Agency Attempt to Obtain
Consent to a Search Instead of a Warrant?
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra note 5, at 77.
United States v. BisweU, supra note 6, at 315.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 313, citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, supra note 14, at 271.
See v. Seattle, supra note 3, at 546.
Midwest Growers Cooperative Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 462 (9th Cir. 1976).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/7

8

Reed: Searches by Administrative Agencies after Barlow's and Tyler: Fou

1979

COMMENTS

215

The Supreme Court in Camara, the case on which the
Barlow's opinion is largely based, offers this guideline:
It seems likely that warrants should normally be
sought only after entry is refused unless there has
been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry.57
Both Camara and Barlow's express the hope that, in
most cases, consent to warrantless searches will be given.58
Camara and Barlow's imply a doctrine that, absent special
circumstances, an administrative agency should not seek a
search warrant before an inspection is attempted. However,
the Supreme Court has indicated a clear preference for warrants when police conduct an ordinary criminal investigation
search." The two doctrines are not necessarily in conflict.
However, a United States district court which suppressed
evidence obtained during an administrative search in which
the validity of the consent to search was challenged appears
to have confused the two doctrines. It said, "Given the ease
of obtaining administrative search warrants, there is no excuse for not obtaining one as a matter of course or at least as
a safety precaution when other validating factors such as
consent are questionable." 60 United States v. Pugh shows
that administrative agencies cannot rely with complete confidence on the Camara guideline on when to seek consent
rather than administrative search warrant.
What is required to Obtain a Search Warrant for an
Administrative Search?
The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment states,
"no warrant shall issue except on probable cause."
Numerous Supreme Court criminal law cases define probable
cause. In Barlow's the Court states that "Probable cause in
the criminal law sense is not required [to obtain a warrant for
an administrative search.]" 6 The question then is what constitutes probable cause in the administrative law sense? As a
practical matter the question will arise in two contexts.
First, does an administrative agency have sufficient "ad57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 539-540.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 316.
E.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
United States v. Pugh, 417 F.Supp. 1019, 1023 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 320.
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ministrative" probable cause to conduct an area-wide or
industry-wide search? This question is answered rather easily by Camara which allows area-wide searches upon a showing of sufficient public need. Camara provides less help in
answering the second, far more difficult question: when does
an administrative agency have sufficient "administrative"
probable cause to conduct a search of some particular
business singled out by enforcement personnel. Because of
limited enforcement resources, this second question is very
important to most administrative agencies. It would be likely to arise whenever an administrative agency has a suspicion not rising to the level of criminal law probable cause,
that business X is violating a law which the agency is
charged with enforcing. The Barlow's Court stressed that
the criteria for selecting businesses to be searched must be
neutral:
A warrant showing that a specific business has been
chosen for an OSHA search on the basis of a general
administrative plan for the enforcement of the Act
derived from neutral sources such as, for example,
dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of
the area would protect an employer's Fourth
Amendment rights. [emphasis added].2
The Barlow's Court repeated that an inspection must be
''pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific
neutral criteria," as well as being reasonable under the Constitution and authorized by statute. 3 In the accompanying
footnote the Barlow's Court said:
The application for the inspection order filed by the
secretary ...

represented that "the desired inspec-

tion and investigation are contemplated as part of
an inspection program designed to assume compliance with the Act and are authorized by.. ." The
program was not described, however, or any parts
presented that would indicate why an inspection of
Barlow's establishment was within the program. 4
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323 n.20.
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The Barlow's Court offers a further guideline. It cites
Camara for the proposition that probable cause for an administrative search may be based, "on a showing that
'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ...inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].' "'
Because of limited enforcement personnel most administrative agencies will be able to search only a small
percentage of the facilities in an area or industry. A random
selection of facilities to be searched would be neutral, and it
would appear to be reasonable. However, from the viewpoint
of an agency, it would be more reasonable to substitute for
some of the randomly selected facilities, those sites under
some rational suspicion. In furtherance of this argument an
agency could offer a court a distinction between searches in
criminal and administrative investigations. Unlike administrative investigations, area-wide or industry-wide searches
for criminal investigations are forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. If an administrative agency singles out individual business for a search, it engages in fewer searches
than if it searches all businesses in the area or industry. The
counter argument is that the traditional definition of probable cause (the criminal law definition) must apply unless
the Supreme Court has announced a particular exception;
the Court's exceptions in Camara and Barlow's do not include singling out individual businesses on a suspicion which
does not rise to the level of traditional probable cause.
There are few federal cases on the issue of whether a
specific set of facts constitutes administrative probable
cause. In Marshall v. Shellcast the court said that OSHA
could not rely on industry-wide statistics to support its
claim of administrative probable cause when detailed information regarding the particular industry is available.6
In Marshall v. Weyerhauser Co.6 7 a district court found
an OSHA affidavit insufficient to show a general administrative plan derived from neutral sources. OSHA had
merely shown that the plant it wished to inspect was in65.
66.
67.

Id. at 320, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 538.
Marshall v. Shellcast, 46 U.S.L.W. 2079 (N.D.Ala. 1977).
Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.J. September 7, 1978).
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volved in an industry with a high rate of accidents per
establishment; OSHA had failed to show why the particular
plant sought to be searched was selected instead of other
plants within the same group.
As will be discussed, there have been several criminal
convictions sustained on the basis of evidence obtained pursuant to an administrative search warrant, the sufficiency of
which was later challenged in court. However, these cases involve businesses subject to federal liquor or food and drug
regulation. As noted above, all such businesses may be subject to a Colonnade-Biswell exception in which case the
searches could be done without any probable cause at all.
Consequently, definitions of administrative probable cause
in those cases are of little precendential value to an agency
regulating businesses not subject to a Colonnade-Biswell exception. However, it is worth noting that the First Circuit
recently said that the mere fact that a bar had not been inspected within the past year for compliance with liquor
revenue laws constituted sufficient administrative probable
cause. 8 Also a district court has upheld a section of the Federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act6" which defines administrative probable cause as "a
valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this subchapter." 70 The lack of an analogous statutory definition in
other laws should not be very significant since Congress is
without power to contravene the Fourth Amendment.
An agency's own administrative standards for conducting searches will have some influence on what a court will
consider probable cause for an "administrative" search warrant. The Supreme Court is quite explicit in Barlow's and
Camara in stating that the validity of a search depends not
only on the reasonableness of the particular search, but also
on the reasonableness and existence of an administrative
standard authorizing the search. Some Supreme Court
cases allowing police to "inventory" a vehicle lawfully in
their custody imply that whether or not such an inventory
search is valid turns, in part, on the presence or absence of
68.
69.
70.
71.

United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d 1329, 1331 1st Cir. 1974).
21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et. seq.
21 U.S.C.A. § 880(d)(1).
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.. supra note 8 at 320; Camara v. Municipal Court, supra
note 1, at 538.
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search.7 2

police rules authorizing such a
The rationale appears to be that a written regulation protects against arbitrary searches. In addition, in Barlow's the Court notes that
OSHA's own regulations and inspection manual concede the
lack of need to conduct a warrantless search.73 This statement suggests that an agency's regulations and inspection
manuals are virtually a "brief" to the Court.
Could "Administrative" Search Warrants Be Valid for
Multiple Searches Over an Extended Period of Time?
Search warrants used in criminal investigations are
usually good for a single search and must be executed very
soon after issuance. However, since the Supreme Court has
relaxed the definition of probable cause for administrative
search warrants, some federal courts have issued "administrative" search warrants valid for multiple searches over a
long period of time.7"
In Barlow's the Court offered this rationale for requiring warrants for "administrative" searches:
The authority to make warrantless searches
devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly
those in the field as to when to search and whom to
search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by
statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan
containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant
would then and there advise the owner of the scope
and objects of the search, beyond which limits the
inspector is not expected to proceed.7"
"Administrative" search warrants providing for multiple searches over an extended period of time could be drafted
to satisfactorily answer the objections to warrantless searches quoted above. The troublesome element would be to
avoid "unbridled discretion.. . as to when to search." 6 If an
agency wished to conduct a series of searches, the effective72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

South Dakota v. Opperman 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968); Cady v. Dombrowski 413 U.S. 433, 445 (1973).
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 319.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 N.2 1976).
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra note 8, at 323.
Id
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ness of which would not be impaired by advance notice to the
person whose business is to be searched, the warrant could
authorize a specific schedule of searches. If an agency wished to conduct such a series of searches without advance
notice, an ex parte warrant might contain either a schedule
or criteria for the timing of the searches. The rationale in
Camara for requiring search warrants is very similar to the
Barlow's rationale, but the Court in Camara does not mention the fear that warrantless searches "involve unbridled
discretion... as to when to search." The emphasis in Camara
is that absent a search warrant requirement the person
whose place of business is to be searched could not challenge
the search without risking sanctions." Thus, the Camararationale for requiring warrants for administrative searches is
even more compatible with the idea of "administrative"
search warrants authorizing multiple searches over an
extended period of time. In at least two cases the Supreme
Court suggested that a warrant authorizing random
searches might be obtained."'
The Authority for Obtaining an Administrative
Warrant
No federal statute or court rule specifically authorizes
the issuance of a warrant for an administrative inspection or
search. However, in invalidating statutory regulatory
schemes authorizing warrantless, nonconsensual searches,
the Supreme Court in Camara, Barlow's and See strongly
suggested that courts have inherent power to issue administrative warrants." 9 In Michigan v. Tyler, the Court cited with
approval this language from the Michigan Supreme Court:
"a search may be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in
accordance with reasonable legislative or administrative
standards or, absent their promulgation, judicially prescribed standards." 8 The Tyler Court's discussion of
guidelines on the issuance of administrative warrants
assumes that magistrates will issue the warrants. 8 1 Also, in
77. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 532.
78. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 75, at 557 and Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States (concurrence) 413 U.S. 266, 283 N.3 (1973).
79. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 1, at 538; Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., supra
note 8, at 316; See v. Seattle, supra note 3 at 545.
80. Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9, at 508, citing People v. Tyler, 399 Mich. 564, 584,
250 N.W. 2d 467, 477 (1977).
81. Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9, at 508.
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United States v. New York Telephone Co., 82 the Supreme
Court adopted on expansive interpretation of the All Writs
Act.8" If necesssary, it might be argued that the All Writs
Act is specific statutory authority for the issuance of warrants based on administrative probable cause. Most lower
courts which have considered the issue have held that magistrates may issue warrants based on administrative probable
cause without specific statutory authorization."'
PrecautionsAgainst Tainting a Search
In both criminal and civil proceedings, evidence improperly obtained by the government may be suppressed. 5
A search conducted without valid consent or conducted pursuant to an improperly obtained warrant may be tainted.
In Bumper v. North Carolina8 the Court held invalid the
consent given by an ignorant person to a search after a
policeman bluffed and threatened to get a warrant if consent
was not given. The Ninth Circuit has held that the standards
for judging whether consent to a search is valid are less
stringent for administrative searches than for criminal
searches. 87 The court held that in the context of an administrative search a "manifestation of assent, no matter how
casual, can reasonably be accepted as waiver of warrant."8 8
It said that citizens subject to administrative searches are
not likely to be uninformed or surprised. "Also, the consent
to an inspection is not only not suspect but is to be expected.
The inspection itself is inevitable."'8 9 It should be noted that
while Thriftimart was styled an administrative search by the
court, the case involved convictions for violating the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act,90 and fines were imposed.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

United States v. New York Telephone Co. 434 U.S. 159 1977).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1651.
United States v. Blanchard, supra note 69, at 1331; Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises,
Inc. 418 F. Supp. 627, 630 and634 (D.N.M. 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Products,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Marshall v. Shellcast Corp., supra note
66; Marshall v. Chromalloy American Corp., 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis. 1977); But
cf Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 440-441 (D. Idaho 1976), affd on other
grounds, supra note 8.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
United States v. Thriftimart, 429 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1970).
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1009.
21 U.S.C.A. § 331(k) and § 333(a).
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However, in United States v. Pugh a district court
granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to
an administrative warrant and used in a criminal conviction
on the grounds that an informed consent to the full scope of
the search was not given and commented adversely on the
government agent's threats to get a warrant in response to
questions about his search authority by the defendant.9 1
These two cases do not make for an easy rule on how the
validity of consent to a search by an administrative agency
is to be judged.
The Supreme Court's handling of the consent issue in
Biswell should not be confused with the situation in which
an agency lacks power to conduct a warrantless search or to
punish the refusal to allow one. In Biswell the defendant
"consented" to a warrantless search authorized by a valid
statute rather than face criminal prosecution for refusing to
allow the search. The Court found Bumper v. North Carolina,
inapposite since the police demand to search in Biswell was
based "not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute." 2
If a search warrant is improperly obtained, the fruits of
a search conducted pursuant to it should be suppressed. 93 It
might be argued that the government's use of an "administrative warrant" to conduct an essentially criminal investigation would be an intolerable circumvention of the
Fourth Amendment guarantee that no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause that a crime has been committed. It is not at all clear that such logic prevails.
In Michigan v. Tyler the Supreme Court obliquely addressed this issue.9 4 The Tyler Court upheld a Michigan
Supreme Court reversal of an arson conviction based on
evidence obtained by police and fire officials who visited the
fire scene without a warrant. The court said that firemen and
police, without a warrant, may put out a fire and conduct an
initial investigation of the fire while they are still on the
premises as a result of the firefighting activity. 5 Further
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

United States v. Pugh, supra note 60, at 1021-1022.
United States v. Biswell, supra note 6, at 315.
E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9.
Id. at 511.
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searches to determine the cause of fire, the Court said, must
be conducted pursuant to an administrative search
warrant.96 The Court continued:
Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such
investigations is admissible at trial, but if the investigating officials find probable cause to believe that
arson has occurred and require further access to
gain evidence.., they must obtain a warrant only
upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime.97
The important implication of the above holding is that
evidence obtained during a search authorized by an administrative warrant is admissible in a criminal prosecution. The
safeguard requirement that a criminal law warrant be obtained when criminal law probable cause exists is less important except as a potential procedural pitfall, since a criminal
law warrant can easily be obtained whenever criminal law
probable cause exists. The important question left
unanswered by the Tyler Court in its summary statement of
the holding is the extent to which an administrative search
warrant can be used in cases in which criminal law probable
cause does not exist but in which a criminal prosecution is
suspected, or is the principal motivation for the investigation. In its discussion the Tyler Court quoted the opinion
below with approval. It said, "But if the authorities are
seeking evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, the
usual standard [of probable cause] will apply."9 " However,
the Tyler Court applied the plain view doctrine in holding
that firemen legitimately in a building without a warrant
may seize evidence of arson within plain view. 99 This raises
the possibility that where civil and criminal violations may
both exist, a search warrant issued on the basis of administrative probable cause can be used to search for civil violations, and evidence of criminal violations found within the
scope of the civil violation search will be admissible under
the plain view doctrine. In virtually all cases in which an administrative agency is conducting an investigation for possible criminal violations, it will be able to claim that it is
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 508, citing 399 Mich. 564, 584, 250 N.W.2d 467, 477 (1977).
Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9,at 4536.
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also-and perhaps, primarily-investigating the possibility
of civil violations. The lower federal courts have consistently
upheld criminal convictions based on evidence obtained during administrative searches conducted upon administrative
probable cause and have not expressed concern that the
traditional, criminal law probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment was circumvented. The Ninth Circuit
recently sustained convictions and jail sentences based on
evidence obtained on the basis of administrative probable
cause.'"' That case involved the Controlled Substances Act,
Section 880(d) of which provides for the issuance of warrants
based on this permissive definition of administrative probable cause: That there be "a valid public interest in the effective enforcement of this title or regulations thereunder sufficient to justify administrative inspections . . ."1' Federal
Drug Enforcement Officials obtained a Section 880(d) warrant to inspect the records of a pharmacy suspected of carrying on an illicit drug trade. The Goldfine court argued that to
invalidate criminal convictions based on administrative
searches would prevent the government from investigating
except when it had no reason to suspect a violation."'
Several other federal courts have produced similar results
and analyses.103
All of the cases just cited involve the liquor, food or
drug industries and all of these industries are arguably sub0 " Possibly, this
ject to a Biswell-Colonnade exception."
distinction is important since Colonnade and Biswell make it
clear that persons who engage in pervasively regulated industries have a lesser expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. 06 Consequently, the available case law
does not definitely settle the question of whether an administrative agency may properly use an administrative
search warrant to conduct an investigation designed
primarily to uncover evidence of criminal violations. On the
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.

v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1976).
801 et. seq.
v. Goldfine, supra note 108, at 819.
v. Blanchard, supra note 67, at 1330-31; Colonnade CateringCorp. v.
United States, 410 F.2d 197, 205 (2nd Cir. 1969), rev 'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 72
(1970); United States v.Montrom, 345 F. Supp. 1337, 1342 (E.D.Pa. 1972), aff'd
mem. 480 F.2d 918,919 (3rd Cir. 1973); and United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp.
364, 367 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
Note 19, supra.
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, note 5, supra, United States v. Biswell,
United States
21 U.S.C.A. §
United States
United States

note 6, supra. See also, note 53, supra.
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one hand, an agency runs some risk of losing a motion to suppress evidence in circumventing the traditional criminal law
probable cause requirement by conducting an essentially
criminal investigation on the basis of administrative probable cause. On the other hand, if an agency obtains a search
warrant based on criminal law probable cause, the defendant
will be able to have the evidence suppressed if he can prove
that there was insufficient criminal law probable cause alleged in the agency's warrant application and that the agency needed criminal law probable cause to obtain the warrant.
In close areas in which it is uncertain whether an agency's suspicions rise to the level of criminal law probable
cause, the agency may attempt to protect its position by
reciting, in its application for an administrative search warrant, whatever suspicions it has in addition to what it deems
to be the minimum justification for an administrative search
warrant. If a court, considering a motion to suppress evidence, determines that when the agency applied for the warrant it had criminal law probable cause and that a criminal
law warrant should have been sought, the agency will be able
to respond that its antecedent justification for the search
was preserved in its warrant application. This is important
since an important policy reason for insisting on a warrant-as opposed to calling a warrantless search reasonable
and permissible under the Fourth Amendment-is that without a warrant application the antecedent justification for the
search cannot be evaluated first hand by a court. This action
might satisfy the Tyler Court's objection to an administrative search warrant when criminal law probable
cause exists.
CONCLUSION

There is inevitable tension between the probable cause
requirement of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, the rule that "except in certain carefully defined classes
of cases, a [warrantless search] . . . is unreasonable," ' 6
and the needs of various agencies to conduct inspections to
protect the public health. It is possible to read into the
Camaraand Barlow's decisions a conscious re-evaluation of
106.

Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9, at 506, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, supra
note 1, at 528-529.
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traditional criminal law probable cause requirements. Many
administrative agencies uncover and prosecute criminal
violations during administrative investigations. As our
society becomes more complex administrative agencies can
be expected to increase their share of society's police work.
The new probable cause standard of Camara found applica10 a case allowing limited warrantless
tion in Terry v. Ohio,"
searches in criminal investigations. In addition, the majority
opinion in Mississippi v. Davis"°8 speculated on a broader application of the new probable cause standard to strictly
criminal investigations.
However, taken at face value, Camara and Barlow's are
limits on police power, not attempts to lay the groundwork
for an increase in police power. By simultaneously bending
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and
strengthening the rule that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable, the Supreme Court has sought to minimize
the instances in which a search is initiated without prior
judicial authorization. Although magistrates may freely
issue warrants based on administrative probable cause the
warrant does require that the antecedent justification for the
search to be preserved in a perjury proof manner. Evidence
obtained on the basis of a warrant issued without proper administrative probable cause should be suppressable.
However, recording the antecedent justification for the
search has been accomplished only at the expense of redefining probable cause.
Whether or not Camara,See, Barlow's and Tyler lead to
an increase or weakening of society's police power will depend on future Supreme Court cases defining the extent to
which search warrants issued on the basis of administrative
probable cause may be used to produce admissible evidence
of criminal violations. Although the Tyler Court announced
a holding'019 far in excess of that needed to dispose of the
case, it avoided a clear commitment on this important question.
JONATHAN
107.
108.
109.

C.

REED

Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Davis v. Mississippi 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Michigan v. Tyler, supra note 9, at 511-512.
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